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Bitcoin as the Interplanetary Currency Standard: An Architectural Analysis Based on Proof of Transmission Timestamp (PoTT)

Analysis of a novel architecture enabling Bitcoin usage over interplanetary distances utilizing Proof of Transmission Timestamp (PoTT) and Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN).
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Wannan binciken yayi nazarin yiwuwar kafa Bitcoin a matsayin ma'aunin kuɗi na gama-gari tsakanin Duniya da Mars, don magance ƙalubalen sadarwa tsakanin taurari. Lokacin haske guda ɗaya (OWLT) tsakanin taurarin biyu yana tsakanin mintuna 3 zuwa 22, kuma haɗin yana da katsewa da yankewa. Waɗannan iyakokin zahiri sun sa haƙon Bitcoin na lokaci guda ya zama mara amfani, amma sun bar fili don tabbatarwa, biyan kuɗi na gida da ƙididdige kuɗi a lokuta daban-daban. Wannan aikin ya gabatar da wani sabon tsari na sirri na sirri – Hujjar Tabbacin Lokacin Aikawa (PoTT), wanda aka tsara don ƙirƙirar hanyar bincike mai ƙarfi don bayanan Bitcoin da ke wucewa ta waɗannan hanyoyin sadarwa masu jinkiri da saukin katsewa.

2. Core Contributions

The main contributions of this paper include:

3. Technical Status and Fundamentals

This work is built upon the following key areas:

4. System Model and Assumptions

The model assumes communication occurs within the star's Circumstellar Habitable Zone (CHZ), using Earth-Mars as a typical use case. Key parameters include:

5. Proof of Transmission Timestamp (PoTT)

PoTT is the core innovation. It is a cryptographic receipt generated when a data bundle (e.g., a Bitcoin transaction or block header) enters a high-latency link. This receipt contains:

A ƙofar fitarwa, tashar fitarwa tana ba da sa hannu da kuma alamar lokaci da suka dace. Wannan jerin rasit na sa hannu yana ba da bin diddigin bincike maras canzawa, yana tabbatar da cewa bayanan suna cikin jigilar kaya a cikin lokacin jinkirin da ake iƙirari. Wannan yana rage matsalar ɗaukar alhaki, inda mai watsawa mara kyau zai iya da'awar cewa jinkiri mai yawa ya samo asali ne daga "ƙayyadaddun zahiri" ba rashin aikin sa ba.

6. End-to-End Architecture

Tsarin da aka gabatar ya haɗa abubuwa da yawa:

  1. Transport Layer: DTN (BPv7/BPSec) with PoTT extension provides a store-and-forward backbone.
  2. Data Dissemination: Header-first replication allows Martian nodes to quickly verify the Proof-of-Work of new blocks from Earth, updating their view of the chain tip before the full block (containing transactions) arrives.
  3. Payment Channel: Lightning channels are established with a significantly increased `cltv_expiry_delta` value. The calculation formula considers the maximum one-way light time, network jitter ($J$), and a safety margin ($\Delta_{extra}^{CLTV}$): $CLTV_{delta} = 2 \times OWLT_{max} + J + \Delta_{extra}^{CLTV}$. This is converted to a number of blocks using Bitcoin's 10-minute block time.
  4. Watchtower: Planetary Watchtower (on Mars) monitors channel status to penalize fraud, as Earth-based watchtowers fail due to latency.
  5. Settlement: Two models were proposed:
    • Strong Federation: A multi-signature federation on Mars hosts a 1:1 pegged Bitcoin balance, issuing local assets for fast settlement. Trusted but practical for early colonies.
    • Blind Merged Mining (BMM) Commit Chain: A sidechain where miners commit to Bitcoin blocks without seeing the sidechain data. If the technology matures, it can provide a stronger trust-minimized settlement layer.

7. Security Analysis

The security of PoTT relies on the integrity of the time beacon system. If the time beacons of both the source (Earth) and the target (Mars) are compromised, PoTT degenerates into an "administrative assertion" rather than a cryptographic proof. This paper outlines the verification patterns:

This architecture does not alter Bitcoin's core security model. A double-spend attack still requires control of 51% of the Earth's hashrate. The primary new attack vector is time-source subversion, which PoTT makes evident.

8. Implementation Roadmap

Deployment Plan to be Conducted in Phases:

  1. Phase I (Experimental): Deploy DTN nodes with PoTT on the Earth-LEO-Moon link to test protocol and delay tolerance.
  2. Phase Two (Early Mars): Establish a strong alliance settlement system for small Mars bases. Use block header-first replication and simple time-lock contracts.
  3. Phase Three (Mature Colony): If the technology is validated and adopted on Earth, transition to the BMM submission chain for settlement, moving towards a more decentralized model.

9. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that Bitcoin can function as an interplanetary monetary standard without modifying its core consensus rules. By introducing Proof of Transmission Timestamp (PoTT) and adapting higher-layer protocols (Lightning Network, sidechains) to accommodate latency, a viable system for verification, payment, and settlement between Earth and Mars is achievable. Earth's L1 monetary base remains unchanged, preserving its scarcity, while Mars operates a locally anchored economic system.

10. Analyst Perspective

Core Insights: This is not merely a network paper, but a profound thought experiment on monetary sovereignty and system resilience. The authors are not just solving a latency problem—they are attempting to fortify Bitcoin's "immutable" core against a physical reality (interplanetary distances) that fundamentally breaks its synchronization assumption. The true innovation is PoTT, which redefines latency from a vulnerability into a verifiable, auditable asset. This is a classic example of the maxim, "Don't fight physics, measure it."

Logical Thread: The argument proceeds with elegant recursion. It begins with Bitcoin's immutable rules. Confronts the physical impossibility of synchronous consensus across light-minutes. Instead of breaking the rules (unacceptable to Bitcoiners), it builds a layer of accountability (PoTT) atop a tolerant transport layer (DTN). Then, it adapts existing scalability layers (Lightning Network, sidechains) to operate within this new, accountable yet asynchronous environment. The logic is tight: protect the sacred base layer, pursue aggressive innovation in the flexible higher layers.

Strengths and Weaknesses: The advantage lies in its pragmatic, layered approach, which respects the political and security realities of Bitcoin. The use of the DTN standard (BPv7) and the clear phased deployment demonstrate genuine engineering thinking. However, a significant defect is the trust assumption regarding the time beacon. As the authors acknowledge, a compromised time source would reduce PoTT to a performance. Proposals for decentralized time synchronization in space, such as using pulsar signals, are still in their infancy. Furthermore, the "strong federation" model for early Mars is a bitter pill for decentralization maximalists—it is essentially a trusted bank, and this necessity highlights the tension between idealism and colonial practicality.

Actionable Insights: For developers on Earth, concepts like block header-first replication and explicitly accounting for latency in the Lightning Network can be immediately applied to terrestrial high-latency links (e.g., satellite internet). Regulators should note the paper's clear taxonomy: Earth's Bitcoin remains unchanged, while Mars uses an anchored system. This creates a clear separation of jurisdiction and monetary policy. For space agencies, this provides a concrete use case and set of requirements for next-generation space internets (like NASA's SCaN) that go beyond telemetry, focusing on economic data flows. The call to standardize PoTT within the IETF's DTN working group is a critical next step.

11. Technical Details and Formulas

Key parameterization involves calculating the Lightning Network timelocks. The required `cltv_expiry_delta` expressed in number of blocks is derived from the maximum round-trip time (RTT):

$\text{CLTV}_{\text{blocks}} = \left\lceil \frac{2 \times \text{OWLT}_{\text{max}} + J + \Delta_{\text{extra}}^{\text{CLTV}}}{600 \text{ seconds}} \right\rceil$

Where:

For a conservative Earth-Mars channel, assuming a 22-minute one-way light time, the `cltv_expiry_delta` could easily exceed 1000 blocks (approximately one week), which would fundamentally alter the economics of channel liquidity.

12. Experimental Results and Charts

This paper references two key concept diagrams:

  1. Figure 3: CLTV Block Conversion: This chart maps the Earth-Mars synodic period (one-way light time from 3 to 22 minutes) onto a Bitcoin block height timeline. It shows how the required CLTV delta in blocks expands dramatically during solar conjunction (when the planets are on opposite sides of the Sun). This is not experimental data, but a crucial visualization of the design constraints.
  2. Figure 4: PoTT Metadata Attachment: This figure details the protocol stack, showing where PoTT metadata (ingress/egress timestamps, signatures) is attached to BPv7 bundles carrying Bitcoin data (block headers, transactions, Lightning Network updates). It illustrates the layered architecture: Bitcoin application data is encapsulated within PoTT-enhanced DTN bundles for interplanetary transmission.

The "experimental" aspect lies in the formal verification of the PoTT protocol's security properties and the parameter sweep of CLTV values under different orbital conditions.

13. Analysis Framework Example

Case: Assessing Settlement Finality Risk for a Mars Mining Outpost.

1. Define parameters:
- Asset: Monthly salary (equivalent to 10 BTC).
- Settlement model: Second-stage strong alliance.
- Threat: Alliance operator insolvency or fraud.

2. Apply the PoTT framework:
- The outpost receives an "anchor-in" transaction claim from Earth.
- Instead of trusting this claim directly, the outpost requests the PoTT audit trail for the corresponding BTC transaction bundle initiated from Earth.
- Verification steps:

  1. Check the ingress signature from known Earth DTN gateways.
  2. Validate the ingress timestamp against an independent feed of NASA Deep Space Network time signals.
  3. Calculate the expected transmission time based on published ephemeris data for that date.
  4. Verify the exit signature from the Mars relay station.
  5. Confirm that the exit timestamp is consistent with the expected arrival window.

3. Risk Score:
- If the PoTT chain verification passes and the timestamps are consistent within the expected jitter range:Low Risk. Can be settled locally.
- If the PoTT signature is valid but the timestamp does not match the ephemeris data:Medium risk. Flag for investigation; potential time beacon issue.
- If the PoTT chain is missing or the signature is invalid:High risk. Reject settlement; initiate a dispute to the consortium.

This framework shifts trust from the consortium's claims to the verifiable physical properties of the communication channel.

14. Future Applications and Directions

Its impact extends far beyond Mars:

15. References

  1. Z. Wilcox, "Blind Merged Mining: A Protocol for Trustless Inter-Blockchain Interoperability," 2021.
  2. M. Moser et al., "Sidechains and Interoperability," in Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, 2022.
  3. NASA JPL, "Horizons System / SPICE Ephemeris," https://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/horizons/.
  4. S. Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," 2008.
  5. J. Garay et al., "The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications," in EUROCRYPT, 2015. (Early work analyzing consensus under delay).
  6. IETF, "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," 1997.
  7. IETF, "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", 2017.
  8. CCSDS, "Bundle Protocol Version 7 (BPv7)", CCSDS 734.2-B-1, 2022.
  9. P. Kapitza et al., "CheapBFT: Resource-Efficient Byzantine Fault Tolerance", in Proceedings of the 7th ACM European Conference on Computer Systems, 2012. (Related to decentralized time consensus).
  10. J. Poon & T. Dryja,《比特币闪电网络:可扩展的链下即时支付》,2016年。